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Árhatás és az ajánlati könyv visszatöltődése: 
Miért kell törődnünk az információval rendelkező 
limitajánlatokat adó kereskedőkkel? 
 
Havran Dániel – Váradi Kata 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A tanulmányban az ajánlati könyv visszatöltődésének dinamikáját vizsgáljuk a tisztán 
ajánlatvezérelt tőzsdéken. Egy piaci ajánlatot adó szereplő számára a vétel vagy az eladás 
középártól való eltérésének költségét a limitajánlatok elhelyezkedése adja meg. Ezeknek a 
kereskedési költségeknek, valamint az érkező piaci ajánlatok sorozatának kapcsolatát 
vizsgálva azt találjuk, hogy a kereskedés vételi és eladási oldali költségei jelentősen hatnak a 
jövőbeli piaci ajánlatok irányára. A kereskedés vételi és eladási oldali költségei átlaghoz 
visszahúzó folyamatot írnak le, amelyet a piaci tranzakciók térítenek ki egyensúlyi 
szintjükből. Az ajánlati könyves piac további elemzéséhez kiterjesztjük a kereskedési 
költségen alapuló megközelítést és az ajánlati könyv alakját több jellemző segítségével írjuk 
le. A Budapesti Értéktőzsde BLM-adatait felhasználva három tényezőre bontjuk a vételi és 
eladási azonnali árhatásfüggvényt: meredekségre, görbületre (konvexitás), valamint 
púposságra (ajánlatok helyi tömörülése). A becsült egyenletek alapján szimulált 
impulzusválasz függvényeket használva egy-egy tranzakció tipikus rövid és hosszú távú 
hatásait adjuk meg és írjuk le. A hosszú távú hatásokból levonható tanulság, hogy a 
limitajánlatokat adó (többnyire algoritmusokkal dolgozó) kereskedők folyamatosan a 
középárhoz igazítják ajánlatelhelyezési stratégiájukat, a piaci tranzakciók hosszú távon a 
könyv alakját nem, csak szintjét befolyásolják.  
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függvény, ajánlatvezérelt piac 
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1 Introduction
This study investigates the relationship between the limit order book structure and the market
order flow. The structure of the limit order book reflects the current placements of the liquidity
providers, based on their information about the value of the asset and the arrival rate of the
market orders. The liquidity providers compete with each other for market order-flow that
results a characteristic shape for the order book in equilibrium. Dynamics of this structure are
closely related to the resiliency of electronic exchanges, which is known as one of the characters
of market liquidity. In our terms, market resiliency is the recovery process of the order book
in response to temporary market order imbalance, involving the dynamics of price, order-flow
and the shape of the limit order book. We explore how the market order flows are influenced
by the current states of the limit order book, and vice versa, how market trade modify the
configuration of the limit order book.
The evolution of the limit order book is explained in numerous theoretical papers, among
others, in the seminal works of Foucault (1999), Parlour (1998), and Rosu (2009). According to
them, competition of the liquidity providers forms the features of the market, such as the bid-
ask spread and the depth, moreover the shape of the limit order book. These theories explicate
how rational market players do limit order placements strategically and how the typical limit
order book structures are built up.
Market order flow may influence the limit order book in two ways. While new information
may drive to permanent transformation of the limit order book, sudden liquidity needs of
uninformed traders can cause temporary effects. There are market trades which do not eat
up the entire depth at the best level, but they bring some information about the value of the
traded asset. While the price impact of market orders are commonly examined in the literature,
market impact for the limit order structure has not been investigated yet in details. When limit
orders in the book are eaten up by non-informative aggressive market orders (e.g. one large
order or a group of consecutive market orders), limit order structure changes mechanically right
after the trade, but it recovers later on to the equilibrium state. The process of limit order book
readjustment is not documented empirically well.
Majority of the theoretical expositions supposes that market order flows are exogeneous and
evolve independently from the actual state of the limit order book. On the one hand, this is a
common and tractable assumption. Impatient traders who submit market orders can be more
informed about the value of the asset then the patient traders. On the other hand, imbalances
of the limit order book may have some significant effects on the trading strategies of market
players. Rosu (2015) highlights that liquidity providers can possess ”soft” information (new
information that cannot be profitably traded with market orders), which should recoil to the
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market order flow as well. As a consequence, limit orders can reveal some information, thus
market order flow and limit order book should be jointly examined.
The understanding of the process of order book resiliency may serve better information both
for liquidity takers and providers. Liquidity takers are able to plan their order splitting strategies
better by considering the evolution of the entire immediate price impact function instead of the
evolution of the future prices (market impacts of the trade). Liquidity providers can track
on the transformations of the limit order book after a market transaction. By following their
limit order placements during the transition, they can enhance their limit order monitoring
costs. Immediate price impact predictions can be used for regulatory purposes as well, for
example, liquidity adjusted value-at-risk models can benefit from invoking immediate price
impact prediction of trades.
Our study addresses two main questions about the order book resiliency. The first question
regards to the relation between market orders and the cost of trade. In our terms, cost of trade is
the difference that a market order submitting trader pays more than the mid-quote, or receives
less then the mid-quote. That is a one-sided extension of the bid-ask spread. We are curious to
know how this trade cost influences the market order flow. Do large one-sided trade costs imply
low demand for liquidity (market buy or market sell)? Do bid and ask trade costs signal the
direction of future trades or the future prices? What is the stronger effect, the liquidity demand
elasticity or the signalling effect? What sould be the proper way to measure these effects? By
extending the examination of one-dimensional trade costs, we consider the market impacts for
the structure of the order book in our second question. What happens typically after a market
trade with the structure of limit orders? What are the mechanical and the non-mechanical
effects of trades for the shape of the limit orders? As limit order monitoring costs decreased
in the last decade, liquidity providers prefer to use algorithmic trading for placing their limits
in the book. These players can revise their order placement strategy very fast in response to a
market trade. Do liquidity providers peg the limit orders to the mid-quote? Does the limit order
book take the same shape as it was before? Is there any permanent effect of a trade because of
the information content of market orders? What can we learn from the rearrangement process
of the book?
Our main academic contributions are the following. To answer our first question, we develop
a model to describe the price dynamics taking into account the evolution of the costs of trade.
Assuming that bid and ask side costs of trade revert to their means, and trade costs influence
future market order flow, we model the ask and bid quote changes, the bid and ask side costs of
a trade and signed trade size in a difference equation system. We use stock market transaction
data from the Budapest Stock Exchange for the two most liquid Hungarian stocks, the MOL
and OTP for the period between September and October in 2013. This high frequency dataset
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contains the intra-day cost of round trip data, named Budapest Liquidity Measure. Our tests
confirm the information signalling role of the bid and ask trade costs and moreover the tests
verify the mean-reversion (recovery) hypothesis as well. We find also that market orders have
significant direct effects on the trade costs. To explore our second question, we extend our trade
cost approach to the immediate price impact function concept. Immediate (or virtual) price
impact function depicts the costs of an immediate (a hypothetical, hence virtual) trade over
the mid-quote in different trade sizes. We identify three main components which characterizes
this function. Over the spread, that measures the distance from mid-qoute to the best quote,
we detect slope, convexity and hump-shape are the significant attributes what describe the
liquidity structure of the order book. These components are very similar both on the bid and
ask sides. We extend our first model with these attributes to get more precise picture about the
immediate price impact function movements. According to the impulse-response simulations
based on the estimation of the VAR model, we document the direct mechanical effects and the
limit order replenishment effects in the transition periods. Our results confirms the hypothesis
about pegging of limit orders, we find permanent impacts for the price without any long term
effects onto the shape of the immediate price impact movements. In this term, the limit order
book recovers to its equilibrium state. For testing robustness of our results, we repeat our
examination considering aggressive market orders. These orders divert the best bid or ask
quotes. We find stronger direct mechanical effects and the same results in qualitative terms.
Moreover, we construct an event study analysis for having a look on the pre- and post-periods
of the aggressive orders that also verifies the predictions of our VAR models. Our limit order
book resiliency analysis may also serve some practical implications. With the simulated order
book components market players can forecast their impact not only for the market price but
for the market liquidity as well. The proposed method can be implemented by liquidity takers
and providers to add market resiliency into their decisions about trading.
The rest of the paper is structured as the following. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature
of market resiliency and clarifies the concepts of price impact, price recovery and order book
recovery. We present in details our research design in Section 3. Section 4 investigates our
empirical finding and evaluates the results. Section 5 provides the description of the robustness
tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Market Resiliency and Order Book Dynamics
It is usual to describe market liquidity on order driven exchanges with static dimensions (tight-
ness, depth and breadth, general overviews laid down by BIS (1999) or Lybek and Sarr (2002))
and dynamic ones, such as immediacy (e.g. Harris (1990)) and resiliency (e.g. Kyle (1985)).
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Authors, such as Garbade (1982), Kyle (1985), Harris (2003) define market resiliency as how
quickly prices revert to former levels after they change in response to large order flow initiated
by uninformed traders. According to the seminal paper of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), this
price discovery process appears as a consequence of the adverse selection costs. Because traders
do not know whether the new order was provided by an informed trader or not, there will be
some impact of the trade on the price. In contrast to price discovery, price recovery is assigned
by inventory control costs in the market maker literature. However this analogy can be applied
in limit order markets, the theory often connects the recovery process to the limit order submit-
ting procedure of the liquidity providers after an aggressive order eats up the limit placements.
Hence, theoretical papers, such as Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) and Rosu (2009) define
market resiliency as the speed or the probability of that the spread reverts to its former level
before the next transaction following a liquidity shock. Rosu (2015) suggests that the market
resiliency as the character of the recovery process should be extended not only by the spread
and depth but by the structure of the limit order placements.
In empirical studies, price recovery process is often modelled by a vector-autoregressive
system that is eligible to measure the information price impacts of trading as well. Among the
pioneers, Hasbrouck (1991) uses a vector-autoregressive model to analyze the impact of market
orders. This approach focuses on the interconnection between price and order-flow, order book
structure is rarely involved into the analysis. Hasbrouck observes negatively autocorrelated
returns as a consequence of mean reverting mid-quotes and estimates information price impact
to show how a trade permanently shifts price. However, bid and ask side price impacts are not
symmetric. Engle and Patton (2004) find evidences for a strong asymmetric impact of a trade
on bid and ask prices in the short run. Similarly, Escribano and Pascual (2006) conclude that
an unexpected buy order has a bigger effect on average on the ask quote, than an unexpected
sell trade on the bid quote, since the buyer initiated trades are more informative. Some authors
extend this research direction by taking the speed of the trade into the analysis. According to
Easley and O’Hara (1992), the duration between consecutive trades can be a good indicator
of the appearing market news. Later, Dufour and Engle (2000) incorporate this duration
measure to exploit the new information. They propose that the market is more active when the
ratio of informed traders increased in the market. Other authors extend these investigations by
market depth. Coppejans, Domowitz and Madhavan (2004) analyze price impact dynamics and
its relation to depth and volatility and emphasize the clustering phenomenon of market depth.
Using separate ask and bid market depth measures, they find that the volume and market depth
is concentrated in certain points in time, thus strategic order placements have economic value.
Clustering is also present such as increasing depth on the one side of the book enhances depth
on the opposite side as well. Inserting bid-ask spread and volatility into the equation, Hmaied,
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Grar and Sioud (2006) conduct a similar analysis in an emerging economy, on the Tunisian
stock market. They also confirm that depth and price recovery is faster if a security is more
intensely traded.
A market trade may cause price overreaction which is usually followed by a price recovery
process. When an aggressive order eats up several levels from the book, market depth is
insufficient to meet the instantaneous needs, order book will signficantly change. Later on,
liquidity provider traders refill the book. Authors often specify price resiliency as recovery events
after uninformed trades because it is easier to interprete and measure the recovery without any
permanent impacts induced by new information. Degryse, De Jong, van Ravenswaaij and Wuyts
(2005) apply event study methods on Paris Bourse data. According to them, market depth
stays around its normal state before and after aggressive orders, but spread recovery takes
more time. Using a more general definition of resiliency, they find that aggressive orders are
informative and cause persistence price impacts. Muranaga (2005) confirms these findings in a
similar event study about the Japanese stock market. Price resiliency can be driven by many
factors, Dong, Kempf and Yadav (2007) identify the determinants as trade speed, tick size,
transaction size, bid-ask spread, adverse selection costs and unexpected volatility. Large (2007)
suggests to examine price resiliency by Hawkes self-exciting jump processes.
Order book recovery is in close relationship with the dynamic models of limit order trad-
ing and the limit order structure analysis. Foucault (1994), Foucault (1999), Parlour (1998),
Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2005), Rosu (2009) and Large (2009)) contributed to the formal
interpretation of these dynamic models focusing on order submission strategies and order-book
explanations. Majority of these papers study how limit order book varies as a consequence
of a competition among liquidity providers for order-flow. Wuyts (2011) builds a vector-
autoregressive model incorporating different dimensions of liquidity to examine the impacts
of the aggressive orders on the order book. The observed spread, depth, order book imbalance
indicators reverts to a steady-state value within some periods after a shock. Wuyts also presents
bid-ask asymmetry: shocks have a more intensive effect on the ask side. The reverse causality
is also present, order flow is not independent from the state of the order book. Among oth-
ers, Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull and White (2000) and Ranaldo
(2004) find that buy limit order is more likely when the book on the sell side is deep and less
likely when the buy side is deep. One approach for interpreting limit order book snapshots is
the immediate or virtual price impact function (Bouchaud and Potters (2002), Lillo, Farmer
and Mantegna (2003)). Connecting immediate and information (or empirical) price impacts,
Weber and Rosenow (2005) find that because of negative correlation between price changes and
order flow, information price impact function is generally flatter then immediate price impact
function. Applying cost of round trip measures is an other approach for describing the limit
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order book structure. Using event study method on Xetra data from Deutsche Bo¨rse, Gomber
and Schweickert (2002), Gomber, Schweickert and Theissen (2011) observe that cost of round
trip liquidity indicators quickly reverts to ”normal” levels after a large shock. Nigmatullin,
Tyurin and Yin (2007) conduct principal component analyis to determine general factors of
roundtrip cost curve in case of NYSE stocks. They attempt to identify information shock by
generating impluse-responses of the innovation of the established components. In spite of the
numerous progressive studies, explaining the cost of trade and predicting slope and hump-shape
dynamics of the book driven by a normal order-flow is remained an open question.
3 Research Design
In this section we develop our hypotheses about the role of the limit order book in trading
and about the limit order recovery. We also present details about our dataset and the applied
methods. In the entire analysis, we use the following terms as synonyms: immediate price
impact function, cost of trade curve, configuration of the limit orders, shape of the limit order
book. All of these expressions can be derived by the framework of the marginal demand-supply
curve (see in Acerbi and Scandolo (2008)).
3.1 Hypothesis Development
To derive our hypotheses, we go back to Rosu (2009) ’s theory of the limit order book. In our
framework of the limit order book models, there are patient traders (or liquidity providers), and
impatient traders (or liquidity takers). Impatient traders conduct market transactions because
they have new information (informed traders) or the have liquidity needs or other else reason to
do trade (liquidity traders). Patient traders may also have private information about the asset
value, however this is more uncertain (”soft”) and cannot be traded (for example it is between
the available bid and ask quotes). There is a trade-off between exectution risk and winner’s
course when patient traders place their limit orders. Execution risk means the low possibility of
execution if limit quotes are so far from the best quote, winner’s course denotes the alternative
cost of the realized deal to profit of the trade on the second best quote. Liquidity providers
with heterogeneous expectations on the market trade size compete to each other resulting a
hump-shaped order book structure. In general, liquidity providers should consider the trade
volume submitted by liquidity traders and waiting time (execution risk) and the limits provided
by the others (winner’s course). Concentrating on the spread, Foucault et al. (2005) emphasize
the importance of the arrival speed of the market and limit orders. According to them, spread
should be higher when market order arrival rate is higher than the limit order arrival rate. Rosu
(2009) explains the spread and the shape of the limit order book by strategic limit placements
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in a Markov perfect equilibrium game. In his model the immediate price impact function
(configuration of limit orders) can be either concave or convex depending on the distribution
of the arrival rates of multi-unit impatient traders. However Rosu depicts a tractable frame of
the equilibrium and gives implications on the spread reversion as well, he does not serve any
predictions about how the order book transforms in response to a market trade and ignore the
soft information content of limit orders. Recently, Rosu (2015) deals with the dynamics of the
problem in a very formal economic model that is also related to our study. We construct a model
to explain the market price evolution by taking into account the cost of trade. The bid and
ask side trade costs are determined by the configuration of limit orders. The basic idea of our
model is the trade costs caused by immediate price impacts influence the decision of impatient
traders about the direction (sell or buy) of their market trade. We adjust Hasbrouck’s approach
by incorporating price evolution and market order flow with the cost of trade where liquidity
providers replenish the limit order book. In this pure limit order exchange approach we do not
suppose the presence of market makers. In contrast to Hasbrouck, we do not assume inventory
holding behavior of traders, however one can easily develop the inventory holding effects in our
proposed model as well.
In our model there is only one market order and several limit orders in one period. Between
two market orders a number of limit orders can be placed which reconfigure the order book.
Following the notations and the logic of Foucault, Pagano and Roell (2013) on pages 166-175,
we model the market price equals to the combination of the µ expected public value of the asset
and the sign of the market order flow (d has two states: +1 or -1):
pt = µt + γdt (1)
where γ denotes the order processing cost, for example transaction costs of the liquidity providers
ask for the deal. Thus, ask and bid prices can be derived as at = µt + γ and bt = µt − γ. We
express asset value as the sum of the former value, the unexpected trade and a noise:
µt = µt−1 + λ (qt − E [qt |Ωt−1 ]) + εt (2)
with λ measure of the information asymmetry that amplifies the surprise effect. In the equation,
variable q denotes the signed trade volume. The market players anticipate q based on the former
market order flow adjusted by the bid and ask side trade costs:
E [qt |Ωt−1 ] = φtqt−1 + σacat−1 + σbcbt−1 (3)
where c means the difference of the actual cost of trade to equilibrium level of the trade costs.
Both for the ask and the bid sides it can be written as:
ct ≡ Ct − C∗t (4)
8
where C measures the adverse price movement cost and C∗ is the equilibrium level of the
trade cost. The mechanism is the following. When ask cost of trade is high, there can be two
effects onto the signed size. On the one hand, demand elasticity of liquidity takers suggests
that expected trade size decreases, even more, it turns to sell from buy. This phenomenon is
documented by Ranaldo (2004), who finds that traders submit more aggressive orders (limit
orders between bid and ask or market orders eating up the bid and ask) when the limit order
book is deeper on their side. On the other hand, high cost of trade signs for liquidity takers that
placements are at higher limit levels in the order book. This can be a new source of (”soft”)
information for the impatient traders. Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) emphasize the
growing role of algorithmic trade and they argue on that algorithmic liquidity providers decrease
the information asymmetry on the markets. Bloomfield, Maureen and Saar (2005) show by
laboratory experiments that informed traders sometimes use limit orders. Furthermore, Kaniel
and Liu (2006) argue that informed investors prefer to use limit orders under some market
conditions. We formulate the evolution of the trade costs as well. Ask and bid side costs of
trade have the following dynamics:
cat = θ
acat−1 + pi
aqt−1 + ξat (5)
cbt = θ
bcbt−1 + pi
bqt−1 + ξbt (6)
when θ is an autoregressive coefficient. We suppose that the cost of trade converges to the
equilibrium level in time as limit orders arrive or disappear, thus the coefficient should be
0 < θ < 1. The limit order book is not entirely independent from the trade in the past. Let
denotes pi the effect of a market order for limit order replacement. For example, if there is a
buy trade, it mechanically increases the cost of trade, because it eats up some limit orders.
Later on, new limit orders might arrive responding to the lack of liquidity in the book. We
assume that these costs are generally noisy in time, because of some random arrivals of limit
order or order cancellations. However, we interprete innovations in these equation as the soft
information about future asset value. Combining the parts together, price evolution forms as
∆pt = λqt − λφqt−1 − λσacat−1 − λσbcbt−1 + γ∆dt + εt (7)
that says price changes should not be independent from the present and past order-flows and
the former state of the limit order book that reflects the demand and supply of immediate
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liquidity. To get a better picture, we arrange our model in the following system of equations:
∆at = λqt − λφqt−1 − λσacat−1 − λσbcbt−1 + εat (8)
∆bt = λqt − λφqt−1 − λσacat−1 − λσbcbt−1 + εbt (9)
cat = θ
acat−1 + pi
aqt−1 + ξat (10)
cbt = θ
bcbt−1 + pi
bqt−1 + ξbt (11)
qt = φqt−1 + λσacat−1 + λσ
bcbt−1 + ηt (12)
where we modified our previous model setup by modelling ask and bid variation separately,
supposing that they are not cointegrated. The innovation of signed size is the η order-flow that
drives the market in principal. Innovations in trade cost equation may contain soft information.
Residuals in bid and ask variation equations do not bring any additional private information,
they reflect to the new public information. All residual variables are independent to each other.
H1. According to our first hypothesis, the bid and ask side trade costs play role in the price
evolution.
H1.A Information mechanism is effective: σa > 0 and σb < 0 (against to demand mech-
anism where σa < 0 and σb > 0).
H1.B Trade costs revert to their equilibrium levels: 0 < θa < 1, 0 < θb < 1
H1.C Market trades have mechanical effects on trade costs: pia 6= 0 and pib 6= 0.
While the drafted test seems to be straightforward, this approach has a drawback. It ignores
that the trade costs are not equal for all trade volume in a specific time. In other terms,
however we can have a picture about important characters of the market, the suggested method
does not explain comprehensively the limit order book transformations. We are also curious
to know what impacts a market trade implies for the shape of the immediate price impact
function. Readjustment of market depth is empirically investigated by Wuyts (2011), but the
readjustment of other order book attributes, such as the hump-shape can be also important,
because we can reveal more information about the behavior of the liquidity providers even if
they are algorithmic traders. The distance between the limit order concentration and the best
quote depends on the anticipated execution risk. A market trade can imply diverse movements
at different volume levels of the limit order book. It is not obvious whether it modifies the
expectations about the execution risk or not. What kind of temporary effects can we find
because of a market trade? What attributes of the price impact functions (structure of the
limit order book) modifies at that time? What are the typical mechanical movements of the
curve? What are the typical movements induced by liquidity providers? It is often observed,
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that patient traders peg their limit order placements to the actual mid-quote. This means
the immediate price impact function recovers to its equillibrium state. This kind of pegging
mechanism is not entirely unknown in the literature. It also supports the assumption about the
effective monitoring of limit orders, when the patient players are willing to cancel and replace
their orders in all of the cases when a new trade comes. Rosu’s theory predicts no effect on
the change of the price impact function. Only if the arrival rate or submitted volume of the
liquidity traders change, or the players anticipate high positive autocorrelation among trades,
then the patient traders place more limit on the specific side of the book. Moreover, permanent
effects would imply heterogeneity in the evaluation of a market trade among liquidity providers.
Can we find any significant permanent effects of a market trade?
H2. According to our second hypothesis, liquidity providers ”peg” their limit orders to the mid-
quote.
H2.A Market trade has significant temporary impacts onto the shape of immediate price
impact function.
H2.B Market trade has no permanent effects onto the shape of roundtrip cost curve, it
only widens the spread.
In the latter part of the study, we set up and estimate an empirical model to explore these
hypotheses.
3.2 Data
The study uses stock market intraday data provided by the Budapest Stock Exchange. How-
ever, only two of the most liquid stocks are analyzed here, the dataset contains wide range of
information about the transactions and the cost of round trips. The total observations cover
a two-months period from 02/09/2013 to 31/10/2013, this means altogether 43 trading days.
An event is recorded when a market order, limit order submission or cancellation have occured.
The data is aggregated up to one second. The quality of the dataset is close to event-by-event
data, because the intra-second events are relatively rare on the observed market. The entire
dataset consists of time stamps, mid-price, bid and ask levels, spread, total number of price
levels in the book (bid and ask side separately), total volume of bid and ask limit orders in
the book, the market transaction price and volume, and the cost of round trip indicators. The
Budapest Stock Exchange recorded the so-called Budapest Liquidity Measure cost of round
trip indicator, which originates from the Exchange (alias Xetra) Liquidity Measure developed
by Deutsche Bo¨rse (Gomber and Schweickert (2002)). The common definition of the roundtrip
cost is ”the weighted average price at which an order of given size could be executed immediately
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at time t” (Gomber et al. (2011)), that is calculated in the percentage of the mid-price at the
Budapest Stock Exchange. The added value of the dataset is that it provides cost of round trip
indicators at eleven levels, and one-sided cost of trade indicators at eleven bid-side and eleven
ask-side levels for each second over the conventional market transactional data structure.
The two most liquid Hungarian stocks are OTP, the leading commercial bank and MOL
which is the biggest company from the oil industry in the country. The market capitalizations
of these firms are 4.4 billion EUR for OTP, and 4.6 billion EUR for MOL, the free floats are
approximately 64 percentage and 44 percentage. These two stocks are the most frequently
traded stocks on the Budapest Stock Exchange, with an average daily traded volume of 3.3
million EUR for the MOL, and 16.5 million EUR for the OTP in 2013.
During the examined time period, Budapest Stock Exchange operated MMTS trading sys-
tem. (The Exchange has installed and now operates Xetra trading system in the stock trading
section since December 2013.) The trading rules at that time in the Exchange was very similar
than in the European order-driven stock markets. There were three sessions in a trading day:
pre-trading, trading and post-trading sessions. Market transactions were only executed in the
trading session. Trading session started at 9 a.m. and ended at 5 p.m., there was a two minutes
warm-up before active trading from 9 a.m. to 9.02 a.m. Traders were able to submit two main
types of orders: market orders and limit orders. Trades were able to cancel the formerly placed
limit orders before execution. The immediate market impact was bounded by a regulatory con-
straint. That is, market orders were executed only on the first quote level, namely only on the
best bid or on the best ask. When the volume of market order exceeded the available volume
at the best quote, the rest of the order was deleted.
The traders could choose the availability of a limit order by submission. There was an option
to cancel limit orders at the end of the trading day automatically. Altogether the 20 bid and
20 ask best levels of the book were public for the traders. Typical number of these levels for
the major stocks were counted from 150 to 800. The tick size was fixed, for MOL, one unit
was 5 Hungarian Forints, (the domestic currency unit) that was approximately EUR 5/300,
or 1.67 eurocents. For OTP, it was one Hungarian Forint (EUR 1/300), that is around 0.33
eurocents. The tick size was small compared to the transaction price. MOL share price varied
around HUF 15,000 (EUR 50); OTP varied around HUF 5,000 (EUR 16.6). Counterparties
of the market transactions were publicly reported immediately after the trade. In contrast to
New York Stock Exchange, there has not been any specialist on the market, the Exchange was
a pure order-driven market.
We start the analysis with introducing some general statistics of trading. Table 1 shows
summary statistics about the number of orders on daily basis in the observed period. On
an average day around 720 OTP and 385 MOL market transactions were executed. Limit
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order submissions are three times more frequent than market orders and twice more than order
cancellations. According to the median number of orders, the market order - limit order ratio
is around 1:3 and the cancellation over limit orders ratio is around 1:2 in both of the cases, that
signs algorithmic trading activity among the limit order submitters.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The value of the transactions are around 1.3-1.5 times larger than the limit orders. Value of
limit cancellations are close to the value of submitted limit orders. Average value of the market
order is around EUR 13,000 in case of OTP and EUR 10,000 in case of MOL. Medians are
lower, around EUR 5,500 and EUR 4,500.
The dynamics are not independent from the speed of orders. It is well known that speed
of order submissions is different in different time on a trading day. To evaluate the main
characteristics of the speed of market and limit order submissions, and limit cancellations, we
calculate the sample average for the durations of order submissions. Time elapsed between the
same type of orders are counted in seconds. Furthermore, for describing intraday seasonality,
we also calculate these durations for 16 half-hour periods that covers trading day.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The speed of the orders are the highest right after opening and before closing. Regarding the
overall day evaluation, we document both mean and median values of the time elapsed between
consecutive orders in seconds. Typically, the ratios on mean elapsed time of market-limit orders
and limit-cancellations are 1 to 1.5 and 1 to 3. In median terms, limit order submissions
are twice faster than market orders and cancellations, which are held almost the same time.
Median values are lower than means that signs asymmetric distribution of arrival times, close
to exponential distribution.
3.3 Methodology
There are two common approaches to capture the structure of the limit order book. One is
using limit order levels as is and the other is using round trip costs. This indicator shows
the round trip execution cost of a market order which is defined by the v targeted value of
the trade. Among the empirical studies, Gomber and Schweickert (2002) and Gomber et al.
(2011) introduced the cost of round trip indicators into the discussion by investigating Xetra
data from the German stock market. Similarly to the Deutsche Bo¨rse’s Exchange Liquidity
Measure (XLM), Budapest Stock Exchange also reports Budapest Liquidity Measure (BLM).
These measures are the sum of two components, the so called liquidity premium and adverse
price movement. We define liquidity premium as the relative half-spread in basis points, or
LP ≡ a− b
2m
× 10 000 (13)
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where a and b denotes the best ask and bid quotes in the book, and m means mid-price. This
measure serves as a proxy of market tightness. Adverse price movement can be expressed as
APMa (v) ≡ A (v)− a
m
× 10 000 (14)
for the ask side, and
APM b (v) ≡ −B (v)− b
m
× 10 000 (15)
for the bid side, where A (v) and B (v) is the average price on what a hypothetical trade (buy or
sell) can be executed with v euro amount at a certain time. APM can be used as the proxy of
market depth at different transactional volume levels. Budapest Liquidity Measure is calculated
as BLM (v) ≡ 2LP+APM b (v)+APMa (v), it can be interpreted as a weighted spread measure
for different order sizes (Kutas and Ve´gh (2005)). Our dataset contains these liquidity premium
and adverse price movement measures for the ask and bid sides of the limit order book. The
exchange recorded these liquidity indicators for eleven different order sizes, for those seconds of
trading, when there was any kind of change in the order book. This means that snapshots are
documented for all transactions, limit submissions and limit order cancellations.
We show some statistics about liquidity premium and adverse price movements of seven
levels in Table 3. We find that adverse price movement measures at the very large volume levels
do not change in the observed period, thus we skip levels 8-11 from our further analysis. We use
altogether seven levels for bid and seven levels for ask side of the book. All of the indicators are
percentage of the mid-price. The liquidity premium equals to the half spread over mid-price,
adverse price movement measures are calculated as the cost of trading on a certain amount over
mid-price minus the liquidity premium.
[Insert Table 3 here]
The mean and the standard deviation of the costs increase as the volume increases. The table
also details the distributions of each adverse price movement measure.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The means of the adverse price movement indicators draw the ”APM-curve” which is slightly
concave in the function of volume. Figure 1 depicts the average shape of the limit order book
where we plot the total round trip costs in basis point value: (A−m) /m, where A denotes
the average ask price at a certain amount of buying and m is mid-quote, − (B −m) /m and B
brings the similar meaning. However the average curve is concave, we could observe linear and
convex forms in certain periods as well.
We develop a vector-autoregressive (VAR) system to describe market resiliency as the recov-
ery of limit order book structure to normal features. We extend Hasbrouck (1991)’s mid-price
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and order sign bivariate VAR approach with variables that may effectively describe the limit
order book structure. Moreover, contrary to that well-known model we use the returns of bid
and ask levels rather than mid-quote returns. Our model carries also some similarities with the
model presented by Wuyts (2011). In contrast to Wuyts we do not investigate on the aggres-
sive orders and trade size effects, but we use the components of bid and ask side adverse price
movement dynamics to describe the recovery process of the order book, instead of other market
depth proxies. The general formula of our vector autoregressive model follows
yt =
L∑
l=1
Ayt−1 +
M∑
m=0
Bxt−m +Gzt−1 + et (16)
where y vector denotes endogenous and x and z vectors mark exogenous variables. Notation for
the number of lags are L, and M . The equation is represented in transaction time, that means
time refers to the moments of market trades. The model possesses eight endogeneous variables.
The vector of endogenous variables consists of the differences of logarithmic ask and bid quotes,
the limit order book (or cost of trade) components and the sign of the market order:
yt ≡ {dlogaskt, dlogbidt, COT.Compt, qt} (17)
We specify COT.Comps in the latter part that explicates the results. The sequence of the
endogeneous variables is selected based upon some theoretical assumptions. Order flow equation
is the last in the sequence because order-flow brings the major part of the innovations. Both
dlogask and dlogbid variables are publicly known for all players and have instantaneous impact
on the other components, therefore we select to keep them in the first places in the order of
equations. There is no particular reason why ask-side variables overtake bid-side statistics. We
model buy trade shocks that adjust ask side in principal, this suggests the specified order.
We presume that our choice does not modify significantly the outcomes. Many of former
studies, such as Wuyts (2011) and Engle and Patton (2004) find that ask and bid quotes are
cointegrated, that is found in our case as well. We do not impose other cointegrating relations
since only bid and ask quotes are found to be first order integrated. Book components, as the
other endogeneous variables are zero order integrated. This implies that the VAR-model must
be specified in error correction form. We estimate dlogask and dlogbid variables in the model
and put into the equation the lagged difference between logAsk and logBid as an exogenous
variable denoted by z, such as:
zt−1 ≡ logSpreadt−1 (18)
where logSpread represents the cointegrating term. Intraday trade analysis requires to filter
out the diurnal effects of trading fluctuations. For this, we splitted the trading day into 16
half hour sections and created time dummies for each one. To avoid perfect multicollinearity,
we use only 15 dummies by omitting the last. Some characters of intraday seasonality carried
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out by Table 3 that was evaluated before. A dynamic approach of market structure must deal
with the speed of the order submissions. Both of theoretical and empirical works argue on that
time elapsed between consecutive orders should be taken into account during modelling. While
applying durations of the market order is more common in these kind of analyses, one cannot
avoid using limit order durations when predicts the dynamics of the limit order placement
structure. We calculate the time elapsed between two market orders and between two limit
orders for the moments of all transactions. These durations are measured in seconds, some
statistical properties were introduced by Table 3. We use the logarithms of durations in the
regressions to control on the speed of the market. In sum, the vector form of the exogenous
variables are
xt ≡ {T01, T02, . . . , T15, logDur.MOt, logDur.LOt} (19)
where T denotes time dummy, MO and LO stand for market and limit order.
4 Empirical Analysis
The structure of this section is the following. At first, we analyze the hypothesis of the relation-
ship between market order flow and trade costs. For next, we turn to the second hypothesis.
We expose the results about the determining components of the order book structure. Using
the components we conduct the VAR-system estimations and analyze the generated impulse
response functions.
4.1 Trade costs and market order flow
To measure the interconnectedness of market order flow and trade costs, we extend our the-
oretical equation system to a complete vector-autoregressive model. We use all variables for
explanatory variables and we use more lags to reveal the effects over one period. Proposed by
Schwarz information criterion, we find that optimal lag number is L = 4 for OTP and L = 3
for MOL tickers. Among other criteria (e.g. Akaike, Hannan-Quinn or final prediction error)
Schwartz criterion suggests the lowest lag. We remark here that it is common to choose L = 5
lags in the literature, but larger lag number does not significantly add more sense to explain
short term dynamics for this examination. We select the number of lags for exogenous variables
M = 0. All of the variables have no unit root according to Augmented Dickey Fuller-tests.
We specify cost of trade as the immediate price impact of an unusal large trade. This measure
consists of the ”depth weighted levels” of the order book on the domain where trading is rel-
evant. More precisely, ask and bid costs of trade are calculated as the liquidity premium and
the adverse price movement at 70,000 euro level:
Ct ≡ LPt +APMt (70 000) (20)
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We estimate our VAR model with ordinary least squares method. To handle autocorrelation
of the residuals and heteroscedasticity issues, we calculate Newey-West t-values for variable
significance tests.
[Insert Table 4 here]
As it is shown in Table 4., all of the first lag explanatory variables of dlogask and dlogbid,
moreover the signed trade volume are significant. Considering cost of trade for ask and bid
sides, only the first lags of cost of trade variables and signed trade volume are significant, price
variables do not or weakly play a role.
However, this is not entirely the same model that we laid down in the theoretical section, it
is very close to that and it is reasonable to interpret some of the estimated coefficients. We only
investigate here the results for ticker OTP. Having a look at the information role of the limit
order book imbalances for market order flow, we find that σa is around 0.08 and σb is around
−0.05 in signed trade volume equation, both of the coefficients are significant. This confirms the
hypothesis about effective information mechanism. The (first lag) autocorrelation coefficient of
signed trade volume is around φ = 0.2, that is close to Hasbrouck (1991)’s estimation that was
0.167 on his NYSE sample. The order book ’mean reversion’ coefficients are also significant
and around θa = 0.7 and θb = 0.7, that supports the idea about a strong recovery mechanism.
The effects of the market order-flows on cost of trade are around pia = −0.02 and pib = 0.01,
both are significant at least at 10 % level. It implies that a market buy reduces the ask side
trade costs in the next period and increases the bid side costs. At the first glance, the signs of
the coefficients seem to be counter-intuitive. However, mid-price and ask price also shift up in
the majority of the cases reducing the cost of the trade. Furthermore, the relative structure of
the limit order book changes also. It means, in many times when a market buy executes limit
orders at the best quote, offered limit order volume at the new best quote will be deeper. This
may decrease the adverse price movement effect form the mid-quote, hence the ask side cost of
trade lowers. Because of the tick size is relatively small, in the majority of the case, the second
effect is much stronger. We also find some evidences about the speed of the orders. Durations
in the cost of trade equations are negative, slowdown of arrival rate of market orders decreases
the trade cost, so fills the book. The reverse can be observe in the case of limit order durations
that suppose that arrival rates influence the round-trip costs. However, we cannot interpret the
price equation in the VAR system as in our theoretical model, we can measure the information
price impact by impulse response analysis. We get that one standard deviation change in signed
trade size causes approximately λ = 0.08 standard deviation change in the level of bid and ask
quotes. Considering ticker MOL, we do not find any particular differences for our qualitative
implications. In sum, we do not reject our first hypothesis about the reflexive role between
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trade costs and market order flow.
4.2 Decomposition of the limit placement structure
Now, we turn to extend the simple trade cost conception to a trade cost structure. For identify-
ing the dominant driving factors of the book structure, we apply principal component analysis
on adverse price movement data. Because our vector autoregressive system captures the bid and
ask quotes separatelly, we do not add spread-type variables to the principal component analysis.
Thus, we consider trade costs beyond the spread and skip the liquidity premium (LP or relative
half spread) indicator. Furthermore, instead of using the levels of adverse price movements, we
construct cross-sectional differences of the APM indicators to avoid overlaps. These differences
are calculated as
APM (vi,t)−APM (vi−1,t) (21)
where vi means the certain volume on level i at time t. Altogether we have six differences and
we complete this with the first level adverse price movement that can be considered as also a
difference between the first level and the best quote. This results seven measures. Employing
the principal component analysis method, we transfrom orthogonally the seven variables using
correlation matrix for the computations and select the three that bring the most of the informa-
tion. Since the variables are in basis point forms, we suppose that these scaled variables can be
considered as a normalized variable also, hence we take into account the variability differences
among these variables. PCA is computed based upon the correlation matrix.
Table 5 shows the loading of the three components, setting apart the bid and ask side of the
book. We show details for both of the securities. The first three components together explains
around the 75 percentage of the ”marginal APM-curve”.
[Insert Table 5 here]
To get more interpretable results, we have multiplied by minus one all of the first and second
components, except the second component of bid at the OTP ticker. Hence, the loadings imply
that the three most important components are the level, the slope, and the curvature of the
marginal APM-curve. After translating these components to the ”natural” APM-curve, we
can indentify three attributes of the structure: slope, convexity (curvature or quadratic part)
and hump-shape (cubic function like shape). The graphical representations of the components
are obvious, the second component suggests a measure for convexity of price impact functions,
the third signs the temporary concentrations of the limit orders. There is a high similarity
between bid and ask side components. Although, this similarity does not infer automatically
similar dynamic behaviors of the curves, but it verifies the commonalities of the structure in
general. However, the two securities differ in trade size and liquidity, we could not find significant
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differences between the tickers on the resulted loadings. This may suggest that typical variations
of the order book structure are not heavily influenced by trade size and number of orders. Figure
2 visualizes the PCA loadings of the first three components that have the highest explanatory
power.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
These results are in close relationship with Nigmatullin et al. (2007)’s work. Contrary to them,
we run principal component analysis setting apart the bid and the ask side, and we model
comovements of the two sides with the VAR approach in the latter part of this study. The
referred authors explored four factors of the APM-curve: two-side shift, opposite-side shift,
twists in the same direction, twists in the opposite directions. We also find evidences about
shift and twist movements, but we argue moreover on the convexity (curvature) and hump
(cubic) shape, which are also important drivers of the order book movements. In comparison
with their findings, because of the different examination method, we find more factors that
describe the one-side limit order structure and we connect the two sides of the book in another
way.
The outputs of the principal component analysis give the possibility for approaching the
typical shape of immediate price impact curve in a more formal way. Based on the results, we
can define the ask and bid side trade costs (or liquidity premium plus adverse price movement)
as:
c (v) = β0 + β1v + β2v
2 + β3 (v − v)3 (22)
where v = mq and v is a threshold for separating the curve into two domains. In our analysis
reported in this section, we approximated the coefficients by PCA from the derivative of c (v),
that bring similar result as the coefficient estimation of the c′ (v) function which looks like
c′ (v) = β1 + 2β2v + 3β3 (v − v)2 (23)
We argue on that one should deal with the linear, quadratic and cubic part of this marginal
cost of trade curves even if literature does not emphasize very much the importance of the third
part.
The economic interpretation of the components is also interesting. Looking at the formerly
introduced expression (A− a) /m, a positive increment of this measure can either sign the fall
of the mid-quote, or the raise of the A−a. It is difficult to identify that ∆A, ∆a, or ∆m caused
the observed variation. To separate these effects we express the ratio after shock as
A+ ∆A− a−∆a
m+ ∆m
− A− a
m
=
=
∆A−∆a
m
− ∆m/m
1 + ∆m/m
∆A−∆a
m
− ∆m/m
1 + ∆m/m
A− a
m
(24)
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The final formula has three parts: the increments of ∆A and ∆a without mid-price change, and
the mid-price variation effects interacted with ∆A−∆a and A−a. If the latter components are
effectively small, we can approximate the variation of the ratio as the change of price differences
or ∆A -∆a. This approach gives biased results in this case as well, but we can estimate the
size of the bias on the sample. In case of the observed stocks, mid-prices are high compared
to the observed tick-by-tick price jumps. We find that the bias is not so large, the range of
the midprice change in the sample is |(∆m/m) / (1 + ∆m/m)| < 0.02 for both of the securities.
Furthermore, we find that (A− a) /m < 0.013 and the last part of the equation is dominantly
lower than the first one in our observed samples. The low variability allows us to ignore mid-
price movements from the dominant driving factors of APM movements during the qualitative
interpretation.
To conclude, in our case where tick size is relatively small, one can interpret APM movements
as limit order structure changes. Decreasing slope of the curve indicates new limit orders in the
book, curvature captures the hump-shape (limit orders appear far away the best quote), the
cubic form reflects to the interim states of the book when limit orders are removed and replaced
to somewhere else in the book.
4.3 Immediate price impact function and market orders
This part starts with the specification of the VAR model for the dynamics of the order book.
As before, we use the Schwartz criterion for selecting the appropriate lag number. According to
this criterion, we set lag number to L = 3 in our VAR-systems. The exogeneous variable lag is
selected to M = 0, we use the concurrent variables. The selected variables do not have unit root
according to Augmented Dickey Fuller-tests. Neither an intercept nor a trend were included
in the test regressions where number of lags was one. In both of the specified cases, we find
that the residuals are autocorrelated. Multivariate ARCH-LM tests detect heteroscedasticity
as well. To handle the problem of autocorrelated and heretoscedastic residuals, we calculate
Newey-West adjusted t-values for providing the accurate significance level for the estimated
coefficients.
In the specifications, the a1, a2, a3 and b1, b2, b3 variables are z-scores of the constructed
book components are in basis point values. Negative and poisitve values denote divergences
from the most characteristic state. Thus, the equation system describes how the immediate
price impact function looks like at a certain time. This approach is able to illustrate what
the market participants observe when they follow the evolution of the immediate price impact
functions.
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients. Panel A and B belong to tickers OTP and
MOL. We investigate the outcomes commonly for both of the securities. For providing more
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interpretable numbers, dlogask and dlogbid variables are multiplied by 1, 000. Variables a1 and
b1 mean the slope, a2 and b2 the convexity of the immediate price impact functions, and a3
and b3 represent the cubic shape.
[Insert Table 6 here]
As table 6 shows, the limit order components are generally not heavily influenced by the price
changes. Only the slope components are driven by the market order flow (possibly from the
price change). All of the components revert to their means, in terms of majority of their own
lag variables are significant and between zero and one. Furthermore, all of the components
can be explained by the three attributes, however ask side is influenced significantly by ask
side variables, and the same holds for the bid side. We find that the price and all components
variables significantly explain the q signed size, except the cubic (hump)-shape variables. The q
signed size has positive lags that instances to the autocorrelation of market order flow, similarly
to the former case. Moreover, the q signed trade size affects dlogask, dlogbid variables, the
directions of the coefficients meet with the intuitions, price increase in case of buying and
decrease in case of selling. There are evidences about the price reversion as well. The dlogask
and dlogbid possess significant negative lag coefficients. We find strong correlations among
the best bid and ask changes and the structural components of the book as well. The best
quotes are not entirely independent from the configure of the limit order book. It is also not
surprising, that bid and ask variations weakly comove with the spread variations. Reflecting
to the intraday trading patterns, majority of the time dummy coefficients are significant in the
dlogask, dlogbid and order flow equations. Estimated coefficients of logarithmic market order
duration variables suggest that slow arrival rate of market orders induce lower ask and higher
bid, that is, narrower spread. In case of the order book components, market order arrivals do
not explain their distance to their most characteristic state. The higher speed of limit orders
have strong negative effects for the ask and bid slope: higher arrival rate of limit orders flattens
the trade cost curve. Higher spread significantly increases the slope of the ask and the bid side
curves, but it has no significant effects on the other attributes.
The results are robusts in term of the variable specification. Changing the order of the
ask and bid variables to bid and ask sequence, we estimate very similar the coefficients and
significance leves. Extending the models into L = 5 lag VAR systems, the results remain very
close to the analysis exposed before.
4.4 Impulse-response dynamics
We generate impluse-response functions to detect the short run and long run effects of the
order-flow shocks.
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We plot the cumulative orthogonal impulse responses of the logreturns on the best ask and
best bid quotes and non-cumulated levels of the order book components. The shock is one-sigma
variation of q in the positive direction, that is a buy trade. According to Figure 3, bid and ask
quotes shift up after the buy signal, the bid quote shows slightly smaller deviation for both of
the securites. This implies the spread may increase on average after a shock and informative
buy trade causes a new bid limit submission above the best bid.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
We can also observe the recovery of the limit order structure after an order-flow shock. All of
the components significantly divert from zero and recover later on the simulated period. Price
impact slopes, the first bid and ask components show the most characteristic movements. The
intuition behind the response functions is while the best ask raises, the ask immediate price
impact function became less sharp right after the trade. On the opposite side, sharpness of
the bid side immediate price impact increases that may mean arriving new bid orders. The
curvature of bid and ask price impacts varies in different ways. Let us have a look at ticker
OTP, where during the recovery period, immediate price impact is rather convex. In the short
term, ask immediate price impact turns to be concave, then it reverts to be more hump-shaped,
as new limit orders fill the book. Bid price impact became more convex after a buy trade
as well, which can be also the consequence of appearing new bid orders above the best bid.
Ticker MOL is an example of the recovery when immediate price impact turns temporarily
to be more concave. However the ask curve become more concave temporarily, we cannot
detect unambiguous variation for the bid curve. The hump or cubic shape components have
the smallest deviations in the simulations. This can be interpreted as a price impact form that
contains a hump close to the best quote and a ”valley” farther from that. The results are similar
for both of the securities. Ask side response of the shock is slightly negative that strengthen the
curvature component and indicates more intense hump farther from the best ask quote. The bid
curve shows positive response, that means more concentration of the limit orders close to the
best bid after a market buy order. In sum, all of the components converge to their equilibrium
state in both of the observed cases, we did not find any permanent effects expect the price
effects of the trades. We do not find any evidences that rejects the pegging hypothesis. Similar
to Wuyts (2011) we found that the specific properties of the limit order book turns back to
the original state, but price changes permanently. However we did it for other attributes of the
book. We also could confirm that ask side effects are stronger compared to bid side ones.
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4.5 Interpretation of the results
Here we propose possible interpretations of the results. At first, we show an application to get
more impressions about predictions of the immediate price impact curve changes. Secondly,
we give a simple numerical example based on the findings. Finally, we formulate our main
conclusions.
To provide a more illustrative way of the movements reported before, we plot the evolution
of immediate price impact functions in six steps. We depict the typical ask-side and bid-side
curves 1, 2, 3, 5, 10 and 20 periods after a market buy. To emphasize the dynamical effects, we
distort the movements in the pictures for drawing a ”caricature” of the events after a market
buy. The initial curves are kept in the original state, but curves in latter periods are streched.
Hence, the figures can only be considered as illustrations.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Figure 4 shows two kind of snapshot of the immediate price impact curves for both of the
observed stocks. The upper figures show immediate price impact curves that an observer can
realize after a trade. The lower figures draw the long term price impact curves, that informs us
about how much would be the trade cost later on related to the original state at the moment
of a buy trade. As the immediate price impact curves turn back into their original forms, there
is no recovery in terms of the long term effects of price impacts. There is no readjustment in
the sense of the limit order book does not turn back to the initial state.
The impluse-response analysis relates to the transition between two equilibrium states. It
shows if there is a market trade, how the order book turns from one equilibrium to the other.
However, depth is a good proxy for market liquidity, the second and other level of the quotes
proved to be also interesting. Many trades can be only executed on the second best quote, and
levels far away the mid-price are able to reflect the anticipations about the market order flow.
Now, we can describe how the slope, the convexity and the (cubic) hump-shape of the book
change after a trade, and what happens on the opposite side of the book at the same time. We
can measure and model the typical way of the readjustment of the limit order book.
Based upon our experience from the results, we construct a stylized example of the order
book resiliency. Although it is a very simplified issue, we believe it supports the efficient
discussion of the mechanical and non-mechanical movements after a trade. Let us suppose that
there are different size of limit orders at ask levels 100, 102, 104, 106, 108 euros. To keep
the example simple and avoid the problem of discontinuity, we set the tick size to small in
comparison to the price of the asset. Let us suppose that the limit orders are settled down
in an equilibrium state. Step 1: A market buy order executes limit orders at 100 euro price
level. The immediate price impact function transforms mechanically. Right after the market
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trades, liquidity providers start to adjust their limits on both bid and ask sides. We detail here
a possible reaction in two steps. Step 2: A new bid order established that is better than the
best bid. It also modifies the mid-quote. Step 3: Limit orders are replaced on the ask side of
the book to move the orders into a new equilibrium state that gives the same cost of roundtrip
structure that in the original state.
[Insert Table 7 and Figure 5 here]
The immediate price impact function moves in a very typical way as order book changes. The
function close to the best quote sharply increases, the curve become more flat. As the mid-quote
increases, the function shifts down. As the order book trasforms into the new equilibrium, the
immediate price impact curve reshapes to the original form. To conclude, the process of recovery
consists of three steps. By the direct effect of a market buy, the ask side cost of roundtrip curve
shifts up and flattens, the bid side curve steepens. By the indirect effect of bid change, the ask
side cost of roundtrip curve shifts down. At third, concentration of ask limit orders are replaced
to farther from the best quote.
In sum, we provided some empirical evidences about the dynamics of the immediate and
the long term price impacts. Typically, a normal buy transaction induces the following process
of recovery:
1. The best ask and the bid shifts up mechanically, ask variation is generally stronger.
2. Short term reactions of the limit order book structure:
• Ask immediate price impact flattens, bid-side immediate price impact become steeper.
• Ask immediate price impact function transforms to more convex, bid side turns into
less convex.
3. Long term responses:
• Ask curve reverts back to the original slope, it becomes less convex and converges to
its steady-state convexity.
• Bid curve reverts back to the original slope, it becomes less convex and converges to
its steady-state convexity.
Altogether, the mid-quote permanently increases and the immediate price impact function de-
picts typical recovery dynamics and turns back into the original state a predictable way. Our
tests verify that on average, the liquidity providers react in very similar way to the market
order-flow. The anticipations of the liquidity provider limit order submitters about the execu-
tion risk and winner’s course modify because of the public information about the value of the
asset changes. They peg their limit orders to the mid-quote (dominantly by algorithms).
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5 Robustness tests
To validate our findings, we rerun the regressions with an alternative shock identification. We
use aggressive market orders instead of normal market trades to check the recovery processes.
Although there are many definitions of aggressive market orders, we choose a simple approach
that fits for our database where a market order cannot be executed on multiple quote levels.
Thus, we define aggressive market order as the market order that eats up one level of the book.
In practice, it means that a market order is executed on the best ask or bid level, and abolishes
all order at the best level. When the targeted trade size is larger than the available volume on
the best quote, it is reduced. We do not investigate the aggressive limit orders in the robustness
analysis.
We identified altogether 5, 092 aggressive buys and 5, 133 sells for ticker OTP (total number
of observations: 30, 789), and 2, 784 aggressive buys and 3, 095 sells for ticker MOL (N =
16, 533). The ratio of the aggressive market orders to the total number of market orders in the
observed periods 16.5% for buys and 16.6% for sells (OTP) and 16.8% for buy orders and 18.7%
for sells (MOL). We report the impulse-response functions in Figure 6.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
As one can see, the movements of the components are even stronger in case of bid and ask
convexity and hump-shape attributes. For ticker OTP, the results are almost the same. Expe-
riences about ticker MOL reveal some slight differences. At first, the ask slope variation is not
enterily obvious. We remark that tick size is larger in this case and the readjustment of slope
depends on it. The conclusions for convexity variations are more clear here than in the original
case and brings the same results. The variation of the cubic components seems to be similar,
however these changes are not very significant. Summing it up, we do not find any remarkable
differences between the aggressive order specifications and the original cases.
For further exploration, we conduct event study analyses of the aggressive orders as well.
We create time windows that cover 20 periods before and 20 periods after each aggressive order
and calculate the mean of the observations. We execute this procedure for both of the aggressive
buy and sell market orders.
[Insert Figure 7 here]
For ticker OTP, we produce these time windows for 15 variables. The figures seem to be quite
straightforward. Considering the average effects of the aggressive buy, we can formulate the
following statements. For ask and bid quotes, we normalized to the levels to the ask or bid
price at the moment of the declared aggressive trade event. Ask and bid quotes jumps at the
moment of aggressive buy trade. Price effects are larger on the ask side, bid shows slower
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convergence to the long term final price. Both ask and bid quotes start to increase before the
aggressive trade. It may come from the fact that many of aggressive trade arrive in sequences.
Considering signed trade size and trade sign variables, they indicate higher autocorrelations
(higher chance to trade in the specific direction) before and after the aggressive buy. Spread
variable is normalized to the spread size at the time of the aggressive buy. Interestingly spread
is the smallest just before the aggressive buy comes. It is general, that many of new bid
limit orders are submitted above the best bid before aggressive market buy arrives. Later
on, spread turns back to its original state. Looking on the order book components, one can
discover similar movements as impulse-response analysis implies. The variables are normalized
to their state at time of the aggressive buy trade. Ask slope (a1) immediately drops, then
converges to the equilibrium level. Bid slope (b1) increases, then reduces to the normal level.
Ask convexity (a2) fluctuates and goes down before the aggressive event, lifts up by the trade
and decreases on the normal level later on. Bid convexity (b2) emerges after the trade till it
reaches its normal level. However average movements of ask and bid cubic shapes (a3, b3)
are still very noisy, they converge back after the event. Time windows of order placement
speeds also serve us some valuable information. Durations between limit orders are very low
just after the aggressive buy, liquidity providers fills up the book quickly. Order cancellations
also accelarate, this phenomenon indicates active rearrangement of the limit order book through
dominantly algorithmic trading. Market orders speed up after the aggressive orders as well, this
can be the consequence of that quick consecutive buy orders may follow the aggressive buy. We
find very similar picture for the aggressive sell trades. These event studies help to understand
the actions in periods prior to the aggressive (or even the normal) trade events as well. We
have to remark that the autocorrelation among normal trades is tendenciously lower than the
autocorrelation between aggressive market orders. Because of this, the window analysis can
depict some charactestic movements before an aggressive trade, that is not necessarily true for
a normal trade. Furthermore, we find that normal trades have higher price impacts related to
the aggressive trades, that suggests they bring more information for the market players. One
can settle similar consequences in the case of ticker MOL, with slight differences in the cases of
curvature and cubic-shape attributes.
6 Summary
This paper describes the resiliency of the limit order book structure on pure limit order markets.
Our general concept of market resiliency includes not only the recovery of depth and price, but
the reconfiguration of the limit order book. We build up a simple limit order model for analyzing
the connection between trade costs and market order flow. Using intraday data of two stocks
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from Budapest Stock Exchange, we find that the causality is for both directions, trade costs
may serve some information for the liquidity takers, hence costs of trade influence market
order flow. We extend this analysis with focusing on the behavior of the trade cost curves (or
immediate price impact functions) to learn more about the limit order book recovery process
and examine the relationship between market orders and the current configuration of the limit
order book. We detect three major attributes of immediate price impact function beyond the
level of the curve that comes from the spread. The three components are slope, convexity, and a
special cubic shape that signs humps near to the best quote. Using these components, we rerun
the proposed regressions and report the typical movements of the trade cost curves. We find
explicable movements that are caused by direct mechanical effects of the specified market trade,
and the limit order replenishment process. Immediate price impact variations are different on
the ask and bid sides after a trade. Based on the result we suggest a simple procedure for
making forecasts about immediate price impact function variations. Applying aggressive orders
as shocks, robustness tests are confirmed the predictions of our dynamic model.
We test two main hypotheses about the relationship between market order flow and immedi-
ate price impact function. Our examination supports that liquidity providers use (mostly soft)
information about future value of the assets and we find that we can explain some of the market
order flow in the short future considering the bid and ask side costs of trades. Many of liquidity
providers use algortihms for limit order submission and cancellation. We find that these traders
peg their limit orders to the mid-quote and the competition among liquidity providers do not
change by market orders. After temporary adjustments, the immediate price impact recovers
to its original form.
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7 Appendix A
7.1 Table 1
Note: The table gathers the number and value of orders in the period between 02/09/2013 and
31/10/2013 for tickers OTP and MOL. The columns detail the means, medians and standard
deviations, minimum and maximum number of a trading event, and means, medians and stan-
dard deviation of values in the observed period. Values are demoninated in EUR and converted
from HUF (1 EUR was appox. 300 HUF).
Table 1: Summary stats: number of orders on a day (43 days)
Number of transactions Value of Transactions (EUR)
OTP mean median sd min max mean median sd
transactions 717.8 669 201.7 324 1,324 13,515.9 5,469.1 39,599.7
limitbid 1,116.2 1,049 381.8 518 2,249 9,948.7 4,403.0 24,156.5
limitask 1,001.2 975 310.7 355 1,815 10,615.6 4,379.0 26,627.6
marketbuy 333.9 318 101.4 136 587 14,648.9 5,888.9 42,109.9
marketsell 382.2 350 124.1 186 759 12,383.5 4,859.3 36,962.0
cancelbid 525.8 474 239.4 236 1,388 11,911.2 4,295.0 46,539.7
cancelask 459.4 407 183.0 162 924 12,507.4 3,346.3 93,504.9
MOL mean median sd min max mean median sd
transactions 385.2 279 310.6 119 1,611 9,848.6 4,505.6 23,085.6
limitbid 633.8 535 382.8 241 2,149 6,077.1 2,475.0 13,294.7
limitask 585.2 450 365.4 185 1,775 7,046.0 3,812.7 15,145.5
marketbuy 193.7 132 169.1 45 888 9,394.2 4,401.5 22,548.4
marketsell 190.8 135 145.1 66 719 10,176.4 4,618.5 23,003.2
cancelbid 267.7 246 116.7 89 557 7,163.2 2,330.4 39,471.5
cancelask 317.8 250 213.1 69 924 7,076.2 2,599.1 30,175.1
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7.2 Table 2
Note: The table summarizes the elapsed time between the same type of orders in the period
between 02/09/2013 and 31/10/2013 for tickers OTP and MOL. The columns detail the specific
order type. Rows t01-t16 denote half hour sessions of the trading day from 9:00 to 17:00. Means
and medians for the entire day are also reported. Last two rows document the durations of
market and limit submissions and limit cancellations.
Table 2: Time elapsed between the same types of orders (seconds)
OTP MOL
Periods mbuy msell lbid lask cbid cask mbuy msell lbid lask cbid cask
t01 36.7 34.5 11.5 12.1 30.8 32.8 78.0 80.4 22.9 26.9 60.2 61.3
t02 65.4 63.2 19.8 20.8 47.1 50.4 118.2 111.5 35.7 39.2 83.9 87.3
t03 74.1 64.1 22.9 23.2 49.2 53.7 131.5 111.8 39.3 51.4 93.5 102.4
t04 86.1 78.8 29.1 28.6 61.2 66.9 140.2 156.6 45.0 50.7 109.1 98.9
t05 100.7 90.1 30.7 33.0 67.7 72.8 170.0 177.9 56.5 61.3 140.7 105.4
t06 128.2 105.6 33.9 43.2 65.2 101.3 239.0 193.1 68.5 73.1 151.6 137.7
t07 142.5 124.8 36.5 49.1 69.3 108.7 222.0 222.5 68.9 70.0 161.9 126.6
t08 124.2 135.6 39.1 50.4 69.2 112.4 164.6 163.5 61.1 57.1 150.9 92.8
t09 122.1 105.4 37.6 40.5 72.2 79.2 219.8 224.0 60.4 68.6 146.2 111.0
t10 154.6 130.6 42.7 48.9 82.2 88.8 173.3 235.5 61.9 60.7 159.3 102.6
t11 156.4 141.6 38.1 44.3 72.6 74.8 210.0 215.5 62.2 68.7 138.4 136.2
t12 103.5 99.3 31.0 38.8 63.8 79.9 175.5 179.1 46.9 54.2 100.3 89.8
t13 96.1 77.7 28.1 30.0 56.5 67.4 163.0 177.2 51.2 55.7 120.3 95.3
t14 79.8 60.0 24.5 26.9 55.5 52.9 135.4 122.8 45.1 40.0 109.4 72.1
t15 73.8 56.5 20.7 25.5 44.8 48.9 124.8 154.9 42.5 42.5 91.2 72.9
t16 46.9 40.6 16.1 17.5 32.1 35.2 85.1 87.9 26.4 29.5 60.6 50.6
Overall
Mean 85.9 75.0 25.7 28.7 54.6 62.5 147.4 149.7 45.3 49.0 107.4 90.3
Median 25.0 26.0 10.0 12.0 22.0 23.0 37.0 35.0 16.0 17.0 38.0 26.0
Overall MO LO CO MO LO CO
Mean 40.0 58.2 123.4 74.4 100.4 197.7
Median 13 6 13 18 9 19
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7.3 Table 3
Note: The table reports the statistical properites of cost of round trip indicators. LP or liquidity
premium means the relative half spread (half spread over midprice). APM or adverse price
movement means the relative costs of a transaction with a specified volume (EUR) over the best
bid or ask level. Statistics are calculated in transaction time. (1 EUR equals approximately
300 HUF.)
Table 3: Cost of rount trip indicators: summary statistics
OTP, N=30,866 mean sd min p25 median p75 max
lp 5.185 3.66 1.096 2.355 4.59 6.673 43.789
apm bid: e1,000 0.246 1.292 0 0 0 0 43.836
apm bid: e3,000 0.584 1.967 0 0 0 0 51.287
apm bid: e5,000 0.888 2.389 0 0 0 0.590 52.776
apm bid: e10,000 1.624 3.179 0 0 0 2.001 63.123
apm bid: e20,000 2.977 4.345 0 0 1.612 4.125 95.346
apm bid: e40,000 5.451 6.031 0 1.503 3.781 7.691 123.708
apm bid: e70,000 8.882 8.13 0 3.418 7.037 12.05 147.841
apm ask: e1,000 0.278 1.343 0 0 0 0 39.715
apm ask: e3,000 0.701 2.133 0 0 0 0 47.953
apm ask: e5,000 1.045 2.608 0 0 0 0.945 49.948
apm ask: e10,000 1.826 3.356 0 0 0.101 2.166 53.779
apm ask: e20,000 3.228 4.383 0 0 1.806 4.460 84.089
apm ask: e40,000 5.678 5.897 0 1.637 4.024 8.049 107.239
apm ask: e70,000 8.996 7.864 0 3.476 7.165 12.365 123.712
MOL, N=16,563 mean sd min p25 median p75 max
lp 8.055 5.998 1.499 3.348 6.57 10.861 49.044
apm bid: e1,000 0.555 2.2 0 0 0 0 48.93
apm bid: e3,000 1.382 3.544 0 0 0 1.118 57.893
apm bid: e5,000 2.082 4.305 0 0 0 2.530 60.848
apm bid: e10,000 3.698 5.671 0 0 1.757 4.928 64.891
apm bid: e20,000 6.605 7.683 0 1.291 4.12 9.335 90.446
apm bid: e40,000 11.929 10.724 0 4.433 9.139 16.354 110.992
apm bid: e70,000 19.303 14.444 0 9.052 16.346 25.806 141.181
apm ask: e1,000 0.423 2.029 0 0 0 0 59.183
apm ask: e3,000 1.157 3.374 0 0 0 0.340 63.4
apm ask: e5,000 1.814 4.19 0 0 0 2.035 67.692
apm ask: e10,000 3.421 5.721 0 0 1.28 4.438 75.067
apm ask: e20,000 6.469 8.078 0 0.972 3.648 8.946 97.935
apm ask: e40,000 11.968 11.505 0 4.039 8.643 16.324 114.001
apm ask: e70,000 19.529 15.189 0 8.851 15.862 26.042 139.581
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7.4 Table 4
Note: This table details the estimated coefficients of the VAR system for ticker OTP. Variables dlogbid and
dlogask are multiplied by 1000 for better visibilitiy of the coefficients. Level of significance is calculated based
on Newey-West adjusted t-values. Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Table 4: Cost of trade and market orders.
Panel A. Cost of trade and market orders. Ticker: OTP
variables dlogask dlogbid a b q
dlogask.l1 -0.178 *** 0.079 *** 0.202 * -0.015 -0.954 ***
dlogbid.l1 0.091 *** -0.144 *** -0.07 -0.142 -0.426 ***
a.l1 0.025 *** 0.012 *** 0.691 *** 0.07 *** 0.078 ***
b.l1 -0.008 *** -0.019 *** 0.051 *** 0.712 *** -0.051 ***
q.l1 0.008 *** 0.006 *** -0.022 *** 0.013 . 0.201 ***
dlogask.l2 -0.087 *** 0.042 *** 0.072 -0.044 -0.343 ***
dlogbid.l2 0.067 *** -0.064 *** 0.009 0.112 0.035
a.l2 -0.004 * -0.005 ** 0.076 *** -0.018 -0.033 **
b.l2 0.002 0.003 * -0.003 0.051 *** 0.013
q.l2 0.004 *** 0.004 *** -0.013 * 0.013 * 0.115 ***
dlogask.l3 -0.035 ** 0.038 *** -0.066 -0.187 * -0.168 *
dlogbid.l3 0.071 *** -0.034 ** -0.115 0.288 ** 0.068
a.l3 -0.002 0 0.028 * 0 -0.019 .
b.l3 -0.001 0.002 0.012 0.042 ** 0.008
q.l3 0.001 0.002 * -0.004 0.011 * 0.076 ***
dlogask.l4 -0.042 *** 0.016 0.063 -0.003 -0.042
dlogbid.l4 0.015 -0.048 *** 0.07 0.116 -0.015
a.l4 -0.007 *** -0.001 0.069 *** -0.009 -0.014 .
b.l4 0.001 0.003 * -0.013 0.037 ** 0.007
q.l4 0.003 *** 0.003 *** -0.013 * 0.002 0.053 ***
t01 0.096 *** -0.051 ** 0.375 ** 0.693 *** 0.304 **
t02 0.062 *** -0.048 *** 0.079 0.116 0.377 **
t03 0.051 *** -0.065 *** 0.231 * 0.184 . 0.249 .
t04 0.069 *** -0.044 ** -0.091 0.058 0.308 *
t05 0.06 *** -0.059 *** 0.016 -0.064 0.452 **
t06 0.033 * -0.033 * 0.024 -0.079 0.299 .
t07 0.065 *** -0.032 * -0.314 ** -0.037 0.556 **
t08 0.035 * -0.017 -0.09 0.024 0.715 ***
t09 0.041 ** -0.044 ** -0.013 -0.161 0.329 .
t10 0.043 ** -0.062 *** -0.135 -0.207 . 0.398 *
t11 0.056 *** -0.024 -0.029 -0.02 0.434 *
t12 0.07 *** -0.032 * -0.008 -0.055 0.632 ***
t13 0.044 ** -0.06 *** 0.009 0.076 0.132
t14 0.053 *** -0.048 *** 0.04 -0.09 0.067
t15 0.064 *** -0.035 ** -0.051 0.003 0.049
logdur.MO -0.045 *** 0.034 *** -0.221 *** -0.386 *** -0.137 **
logdur.LO 0.047 *** -0.048 *** 0.111 *** 0.214 *** -0.166 ***
lag.logspread -94.47 *** 109.585 *** 24.41 9.508 117.081 *
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Note: This table details the estimated coefficients of the VAR system for ticker MOL. Variables dlogbid and
dlogask are multiplied by 1000 for better visibilitiy of the coefficients. Level of significance is calculated based
on Newey-West adjusted t-values. Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Panel B. Cost of trade and market orders. Ticker: MOL
variables dlogask dlogbid a b q
dlogask.l1 -0.212 *** 0.057 *** 0.428 ** -0.264 * -0.496 ***
dlogbid.l1 0.098 *** -0.178 *** 0.03 0.047 -0.304 ***
a.l1 0.02 *** 0.007 *** 0.748 *** 0.057 *** 0.023 ***
b.l1 -0.01 *** -0.018 *** 0.069 *** 0.728 *** -0.018 **
q.l1 0.01 *** 0.013 *** -0.049 ** 0.005 0.215 ***
dlogask.l2 -0.082 *** 0.041 ** -0.134 0.036 -0.204 ***
dlogbid.l2 0.028 * -0.058 *** 0.155 -0.037 -0.082
a.l2 -0.008 *** -0.003 . 0.071 *** -0.035 * -0.004
b.l2 0.005 . 0.003 -0.024 0.08 *** 0.011
q.l2 0.01 *** 0.008 *** -0.034 * 0.034 * 0.129 ***
dlogask.l3 -0.038 ** 0.019 . 0.05 0.029 -0.103 *
dlogbid.l3 0.031 ** -0.017 0.001 0.051 -0.029
a.l3 -0.003 * 0.001 0.057 *** 0.014 -0.013 **
b.l3 0.001 0.005 ** -0.005 0.067 *** 0.001
q.l3 0.005 ** 0.002 -0.028 . 0.02 0.089 ***
t01 0.264 *** -0.08 1.149 *** 1.77 *** 0.041
t02 0.12 *** -0.122 *** -0.146 -0.022 -0.158
t03 0.084 ** -0.187 *** -0.229 0.154 -0.446 **
t04 0.124 *** -0.077 ** -0.582 * 0.073 0.096
t05 0.143 *** -0.063 * -0.31 0.335 0.053
t06 0.087 ** -0.067 * -0.267 0.464 -0.148
t07 0.076 * -0.14 *** -0.187 -0.216 -0.21
t08 0.039 -0.132 *** 0.235 -0.266 -0.331 *
t09 0.105 *** -0.069 * -0.114 -0.023 -0.029
t10 0.134 *** -0.066 * -0.37 -0.077 0.015
t11 0.106 ** -0.073 ** -0.576 . -0.241 0.118
t12 0.142 *** -0.081 * -0.551 * 0.228 0.073
t13 0.131 *** -0.085 ** -0.256 -0.262 -0.084
t14 0.097 *** -0.136 *** -0.018 -0.121 -0.076
t15 0.095 *** -0.065 ** -0.486 * 0.032 0.078
logdur.MO -0.074 *** 0.049 *** -0.427 *** -0.435 *** -0.089 *
logdur.LO 0.08 *** -0.063 *** 0.257 *** 0.212 *** 0.093 **
lag.logspread -129.268 *** 111.29 *** 99.007 26.179 -29.223
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7.5 Table 5
Note: The table shows the three most significant components of bid and ask adverse price
movement incremental variables. The components are extracted by principal components anal-
ysis. APM or adverse price movement means the relative costs of a transaction with a specified
volume (EUR) over the best bid or ask level. Statistics are calculated in transaction time.
Table 5: Decomposition of the limit order book structure
Panel A. Bid and ask side loadings
OTP
APM diffs (levels in EUR) Bid Comp.1 Bid Comp.2 Bid Comp.3 Ask Comp.1 Ask Comp.2 Ask Comp.3
APM(1000) 0.102 -0.284 -0.729 0.128 -0.267 -0.739
APM(3000)-APM(1000) 0.273 -0.507 -0.291 0.305 -0.494 -0.279
APM(5000)-APM(3000) 0.396 -0.455 0.190 0.405 -0.440 0.191
APM(10000)-APM(5000) 0.464 -0.187 0.392 0.467 -0.180 0.408
APM(20000)-APM(10000) 0.481 0.185 0.204 0.466 0.223 0.199
APM(40000)-APM(20000) 0.439 0.443 -0.187 0.424 0.465 -0.174
APM(70000)-APM(40000) 0.346 0.436 -0.342 0.334 0.438 -0.321
MOL
APM diffs (levels in EUR) Bid Comp.1 Bid Comp.2 Bid Comp.3 Ask Comp.1 Ask Comp.2 Ask Comp.3
APM(1000) 0.124 -0.369 -0.642 0.127 -0.320 -0.704
APM(3000)-APM(1000) 0.275 -0.523 -0.287 0.281 -0.519 -0.269
APM(5000)-APM(3000) 0.399 -0.425 0.243 0.379 -0.448 0.218
APM(10000)-APM(5000) 0.466 -0.138 0.449 0.464 -0.152 0.427
APM(20000)-APM(10000) 0.478 0.212 0.184 0.486 0.198 0.186
APM(40000)-APM(20000) 0.435 0.421 -0.235 0.448 0.419 -0.199
APM(70000)-APM(40000) 0.338 0.410 -0.395 0.328 0.436 -0.357
Panel B. Explanatory power of the components
Comp. 1 2 3 4 5 6
OTP
ask 36.16% 23.65% 15.54% 10.77% 6.73% 4.21% 2.94%
bid 37.39% 22.59% 15.43% 10.81% 6.88% 4.08% 2.82%
MOL
ask 36.19% 23.77% 15.33% 10.65% 6.67% 4.36% 3.02%
bid 36.59% 23.30% 15.48% 10.56% 6.54% 4.35% 3.19%
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7.6 Table 6
Note: This table details the estimated coefficients of the VAR system for ticker OTP. Variables dlogbid and
dlogask are multiplied by 1000 for better visibilitiy of the coefficients. Level of significance is calculated based
on Newey-West adjusted t-values. Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Table 6: Cost of trade structure and market orders.
Panel A. Cost of trade structure and market orders. Ticker: OTP
variables dlogask dlogbid a1 b1 a2 b2 a3 b3 q
dlogask.l1 -0.14 *** 0.059 *** 0.038 0.031 -0.015 0.003 0.019 0.009 -0.885 ***
dlogbid.l1 0.05 *** -0.127 *** -0.001 -0.054 * -0.005 0.003 -0.021 -0.001 -0.549 ***
a1.l1 0.119 *** 0.056 *** 0.615 *** 0.031 * -0.045 *** -0.003 0.039 * 0.02 . 0.402 ***
b1.l1 -0.041 *** -0.093 *** 0.023 * 0.643 *** -0.002 0.039 * 0.01 0.047 ** -0.256 ***
a2.l1 0.002 -0.002 -0.19 *** 0.012 0.459 *** -0.002 -0.021 * -0.002 -0.312 ***
b2.l1 0.009 * 0.026 *** -0.017 * 0.209 *** 0 0.399 *** 0.003 0.051 *** -0.186 ***
a3.l1 0.036 *** 0.014 ** 0.083 *** 0.008 -0.155 *** -0.003 0.337 *** 0.001 -0.037
b3.l1 -0.004 -0.034 *** 0.004 0.086 *** -0.006 0.125 *** 0.023 ** 0.327 *** 0.028
q.l1 0.008 *** 0.006 *** -0.006 *** 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.208 ***
dlogask.l2 -0.056 *** 0.02 -0.004 -0.01 -0.025 -0.039 . -0.018 0.015 -0.312 ***
dlogbid.l2 0.034 ** -0.044 *** 0.046 * 0.024 0.054 ** -0.015 -0.022 0.01 -0.015
a1.l2 -0.015 -0.022 ** 0.057 *** -0.016 -0.023 . -0.013 -0.013 0.007 -0.166 **
b1.l2 0.006 0.012 . 0.002 0.042 * -0.013 0.022 -0.004 -0.006 0.071
a2.l2 0.012 . 0.014 ** 0.01 0.005 0.1 *** 0.01 -0.003 0.009 0.136 ***
b2.l2 0.003 0.006 0.007 -0.004 0 0.086 *** -0.003 0.013 0.091 *
a3.l2 -0.005 -0.003 0.004 0.006 0.004 -0.003 0.073 *** 0.005 0.008
b3.l2 -0.009 -0.003 0.014 -0.023 0.004 0.037 ** 0.002 0.071 *** -0.035
q.l2 0.005 *** 0.004 *** -0.004 ** 0.002 0.002 . 0.001 0 0 0.123 ***
dlogask.l3 -0.029 ** 0.022 * 0.013 -0.02 -0.033 . -0.001 0.008 -0.018 -0.203 **
dlogbid.l3 0.044 *** -0.019 * -0.022 0.034 0.023 -0.011 0.006 -0.008 0.032
a1.l3 -0.027 *** 0.001 0.056 *** 0.02 -0.025 ** 0.006 0.024 ** -0.016 -0.146 ***
b1.l3 -0.002 0.007 0.019 * 0.036 * 0.02 * 0.042 *** 0.004 0.015 . 0.066 .
a2.l3 0.032 *** 0.008 . -0.037 *** -0.007 0.061 *** 0 -0.022 * 0.003 0.163 ***
b2.l3 0.005 0.012 * -0.013 0.016 0.004 0.057 *** -0.008 0.005 0.062 .
a3.l3 -0.006 0.007 0.015 0.013 0.003 -0.002 0.059 *** 0 -0.028
b3.l3 -0.001 0.005 0.012 0.022 0.036 ** 0.011 0.004 0.02 * -0.011
q.l3 0.002 ** 0.002 *** -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.086 ***
t01 0.084 *** -0.045 * 0.065 * 0.124 *** 0.048 . -0.034 0.019 0.018 0.313 **
t02 0.061 *** -0.041 ** -0.015 0.029 0 -0.022 -0.004 -0.031 0.401 **
t03 0.047 ** -0.059 *** 0.028 0.034 0.015 -0.009 -0.011 -0.028 0.251 .
t04 0.065 *** -0.046 *** -0.04 -0.018 0.024 0.021 -0.01 -0.038 . 0.33 *
t05 0.057 *** -0.061 *** -0.029 -0.053 * 0.006 0.031 -0.007 -0.036 . 0.469 **
t06 0.025 . -0.032 * 0.028 0.005 0.073 * -0.009 0.022 -0.058 * 0.309 .
t07 0.063 *** -0.035 * -0.073 * -0.042 0.017 0.024 -0.045 * -0.028 0.573 **
t08 0.029 . -0.019 0.015 -0.027 0.042 0.004 -0.042 . 0.056 * 0.749 ***
t09 0.041 ** -0.04 ** -0.031 -0.026 -0.011 -0.009 -0.004 -0.042 . 0.341 *
t10 0.049 ** -0.052 *** -0.09 ** -0.025 0.008 -0.048 0.033 -0.042 0.428 *
t11 0.06 *** -0.022 -0.034 -0.003 -0.012 0.007 -0.031 -0.055 * 0.446 *
t12 0.077 *** -0.023 -0.055 * -0.009 -0.029 -0.035 -0.018 -0.004 0.662 ***
t13 0.04 ** -0.058 *** -0.016 -0.006 0.031 -0.005 0.011 0.003 0.143
t14 0.05 *** -0.047 *** -0.023 -0.039 . 0.019 0.003 0.028 -0.009 0.075
t15 0.062 *** -0.035 ** -0.041 . -0.025 0.001 0.016 0.001 -0.012 0.05
logdur.MO -0.047 *** 0.035 *** 0.007 -0.029 *** 0.015 . -0.012 0.003 -0.001 -0.137 **
logdur.LO 0.049 *** -0.048 *** -0.036 *** -0.008 -0.023 *** 0.019 ** 0.001 0.004 -0.168 ***
lag.logspread -92.557 *** 105.642 *** 83.548 *** 61.151 *** 13.598 -20.303 . -4.379 7.607 99.736 *
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Note: This table details the estimated coefficients of the VAR system for ticker OTP. Variables dlogbid and
dlogask are multiplied by 1000 for better visibilitiy of the coefficients. Level of significance is calculated based
on Newey-West adjusted t-values. Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Panel B. Cost of trade structure and market orders. Ticker: MOL
variables dlogask dlogbid a1 b1 a2 b2 a3 b3 q
dlogask.l1 -0.2 *** 0.032 * 0.084 *** -0.022 -0.021 0.011 0.015 0.012 -0.49 ***
dlogbid.l1 0.08 *** -0.163 *** -0.028 -0.036 . 0.029 0.046 * -0.027 -0.009 -0.334 ***
a1.l1 0.184 *** 0.064 *** 0.69 *** 0.01 0.033 . 0.004 0.006 0.023 . 0.239 ***
b1.l1 -0.079 *** -0.148 *** 0.04 * 0.698 *** 0 0.035 * -0.003 -0.003 -0.168 ***
a2.l1 -0.047 ** -0.014 . 0.238 *** -0.012 0.424 *** 0.001 0.015 0.01 0.138 ***
b2.l1 0.02 . 0.071 *** -0.013 0.234 *** 0.02 0.487 *** -0.021 -0.01 -0.119 **
a3.l1 0.045 ** 0.002 0.077 *** -0.004 0.193 *** -0.008 0.314 *** 0.003 -0.047
b3.l1 -0.038 *** -0.048 *** 0.039 ** 0.107 *** -0.014 0.187 *** -0.018 . 0.337 *** 0.067 .
q.l1 0.01 *** 0.013 *** -0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.217 ***
dlogask.l2 -0.082 *** 0.017 0.001 -0.006 -0.01 0.003 0.006 0.007 -0.176 ***
dlogbid.l2 0.021 -0.05 ** 0.02 -0.007 -0.017 0.024 0.002 -0.014 -0.119 *
a1.l2 -0.06 ** -0.018 0.056 * -0.021 0.03 0.012 0.019 -0.008 -0.035
b1.l2 0.029 0.011 -0.027 0.036 0.016 0.019 0.008 0.039 * 0.099
a2.l2 -0.027 -0.007 -0.004 -0.011 0.116 *** 0 0.025 . -0.011 -0.039
b2.l2 0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.027 . 0.001 0.075 *** 0.001 0.046 ** 0.056
a3.l2 0 0.004 -0.034 * -0.023 * 0.025 0.01 0.086 *** -0.011 0.072 .
b3.l2 -0.001 0.008 -0.004 0.002 0 0.005 0.018 0.102 *** -0.018
q.l2 0.01 *** 0.009 *** -0.004 . 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.13 ***
dlogask.l3 -0.035 * 0.017 0.006 0.016 0.01 -0.005 0.025 . 0.004 -0.098 *
dlogbid.l3 0.03 * -0.015 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 0.014 -0.015 -0.004 -0.023
a1.l3 -0.003 0.013 0.026 0.034 ** 0.017 -0.02 0.026 . 0.005 -0.118 **
b1.l3 0.007 0.027 * 0.011 0.04 * -0.022 . 0.017 0.003 0.015 0.011
a2.l3 -0.004 -0.007 -0.017 0.021 * 0.054 *** -0.014 0.035 ** -0.001 -0.123 ***
b2.l3 0.007 0.016 0.011 -0.004 -0.019 . 0.048 *** -0.006 0.016 0.034
a3.l3 -0.011 0.008 0.005 0.031 ** 0.022 -0.017 0.063 *** 0.004 -0.06
b3.l3 -0.012 -0.004 0.015 -0.009 0.023 . 0.009 -0.007 0.066 *** 0.007
q.l3 0.004 * 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.087 ***
t01 0.236 *** -0.059 0.107 * 0.14 ** -0.087 * -0.069 0.021 0.089 * 0.021
t02 0.105 *** -0.115 *** -0.042 -0.047 -0.037 0.007 0.01 -0.011 -0.159
t03 0.077 ** -0.17 *** -0.069 * -0.02 -0.019 -0.042 -0.004 0.026 -0.448 **
t04 0.102 *** -0.074 ** -0.051 . -0.014 -0.053 . 0.021 -0.029 -0.035 0.1
t05 0.135 *** -0.033 -0.06 . 0.085 * -0.017 -0.081 * 0.006 -0.058 . 0.064
t06 0.079 * -0.062 . -0.045 0.033 -0.02 0.04 -0.012 -0.038 -0.131
t07 0.05 -0.14 *** 0.022 -0.072 . -0.048 0.008 -0.113 * 0.002 -0.229
t08 0.047 -0.106 *** -0.045 -0.002 0.025 -0.014 0.059 -0.062 . -0.306 .
t09 0.124 *** -0.03 -0.081 * 0.042 0.037 -0.079 . -0.002 -0.029 -0.012
t10 0.115 *** -0.053 . -0.03 -0.014 -0.053 -0.031 -0.022 -0.018 0.016
t11 0.08 * -0.073 ** -0.027 -0.049 -0.076 0.021 -0.038 -0.04 0.118
t12 0.122 *** -0.081 ** -0.07 * 0.002 -0.042 0.021 0.006 -0.064 * 0.08
t13 0.117 *** -0.07 ** -0.046 -0.017 -0.036 -0.014 0.01 -0.076 ** -0.069
t14 0.078 ** -0.127 *** 0 -0.029 -0.021 0.015 -0.06 * -0.059 * -0.073
t15 0.081 ** -0.067 ** -0.059 * -0.032 -0.003 0.023 -0.025 -0.012 0.078
logdur.MO -0.078 *** 0.053 *** -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.016 . 0.005 0.004 -0.091 *
logdur.LO 0.083 *** -0.066 *** -0.021 ** -0.027 *** 0.02 * 0.017 * -0.001 0.005 0.092 **
lag.logspread -121.769 *** 102.703 *** 58.002 *** 46.392 *** -7.742 -1.196 2.631 2.999 -26.986
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7.7 Table 7
Note. This table gives a numerical example about a typical order book recovery process after a market buy. Only
ask side of the limit order book is indicated in details. Four states: 1) original, 2) market buy, 3) new bid limit,
4) ask recovery.
Table 7: Example
original market buy new bid limit ask recovery
quote volume volume volume volume
110 500 500 500 1000
108 1000 1000 1000 3000
106 3000 3000 3000 3000
104 3000 3000 3000 1000
102 1000 1000 1000 1000
100 1000
ask 100 102 102 102
mid 98 99 100 100
bid 96 96 98 98
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8 Appendix B
8.1 Figure 1
Note: X axis shows the value (price × quantity) of a hypothetical trade. Y axis depicts the price divergence
from the mid-price in basis points.
Figure 1: Distance from mid-price in basis point values. Tickers: OTP and MOL
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8.2 Figure 2
Note: The figures illustrate the three main components. X axis counts the APM levels. Y axis shows the loadings
of the components.
OTP
MOL
Figure 2: Principal components: visualisation. Tickers: OTP, MOL
41
8.3 Figure 3
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of a normal buy trade. Size of shock is one standard deviation.
Ticker: OTP.
Figure 3: Impulse-response functions
Impulse-response functions. Ticker: OTP
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of a normal buy trade. Size of shock is one standard deviation.
Ticker: MOL.
Impulse-response functions. Ticker: MOL
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8.4 Figure 4
Note: The figure illustrate the price impact movements induced by a normal buy trade. Ticker: OTP.
Figure 4: Illustration: Six steps of the immediate price impact function.
”Overstreched” movements. Ticker: OTP
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Note: The figure illustrate the price impact movements induced by a normal buy trade. Ticker: MOL.
”Overstreched” movements. Ticker: MOL
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8.5 Figure 5
Note: X axis shows the values of APM levels. Y axis shows the adverse price movement in basis points.
Figure 5: Example: order book dynamics
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8.6 Figure 6
Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of an aggressive buy trade. Size of shock is one standard deviation.
Ticker: OTP.
Figure 6: Impulse-response functions: aggressive market orders
Impulse-response functions:aggressive market orders. Ticker: OTP
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Note: The figure shows the impulse responses of an aggressive buy trade. Size of shock is one standard deviation.
Ticker: MOL.
Impulse-response functions:aggressive market orders. Ticker: MOL
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8.7 Figure 7
Note: The figure shows the means of the variables for 20 periods before and 20 periods after the aggressive buys.
Ticker: OTP.
Figure 7: Robustness, Event study for aggressive market orders
Robustness, Event study for aggressive market buy. Ticker: OTP
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Note: The figure shows the means of the variables for 20 periods before and 20 periods after the aggressive sells.
Ticker: OTP.
Robustness, Event study for aggressive market sell. Ticker: OTP
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Note: The figure shows the means of the variables for 20 periods before and 20 periods after the aggressive buys.
Ticker: MOL.
Robustness, Event study for aggressive market buy. Ticker: MOL
51
Note: The figure shows the means of the variables for 20 periods before and 20 periods after the aggressive sells.
Ticker: MOL.
Robustness, Event study for aggressive market sell. Ticker: MOL
52
